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Abstract
As mobile phones have evolved into ‘smartphones’, with complex operating systems running third-
party software, they have become increasingly vulnerable to malicious applications (malware). We intro-
duce a new design for mitigating malware attacks against smartphone users, based on a small trusted
computing base module, denoted µTCB. The µTCB manages sensitive data and sensors, and provides
core services to applications, independently of the operating system. The user invokes µTCB using a
simple secure attention key, which is pressed in order to validate physical possession of the device and
authorize a sensitive action; this protects private information even if the device is infected with malware.
We present a proof-of-concept implementation of µTCB based on ARM’s TrustZone, a secure execution
environment increasingly found in smartphones, and evaluate our implementation using simulations.
Keywords: Security Kernels; Invasive Software; Smartphones; Trusted Physical Interfaces
1 Introduction
The increasing popularity of cellular phones has steadily shifted personalized computing from wired desktop
machines to wireless mobile devices. Accompanying this shift was a natural move to utilize mobile phones as
‘trusted digital agents’ [1], allowing users to receive private messages and perform mobile payments or other
confidential tasks. Early mobile phones were simple, limited, and had proprietary implementations, leading
to the impression that they were more secure than their multi-purpose desktop counterparts, on which users
could install unchecked, and possibly malicious, third-party software.
Today’s cellular phones, however, have evolved into smartphones: general purpose, complex, com-
puter/sensor devices that employ multiple wireless communication technologies and are ever connected to
both the Internet and their users. In effect, today’s smartphones are a natural extension of a person’s daily
life: texting/emailing friends, catching up on news/stocks, and managing bank accounts. Not only do they
store passwords, account numbers, pictures, and videos that were freely saved on yesterday’s phones, but
they also place numerous sensors well within the comfort zone of their users.
It is therefore not surprising that the evolution to smartphone devices arrived with a concomitant rise
in exploits and attacks. The complex operating systems and variety of applications in today’s smartphones
pose a rich attack surface that was not present in the earlier phones. Malicious applications steal user data,
gain administrative privileges by exploiting software vulnerabilities [2] and steal user credentials by faking
legitimate notifications [3]. Worse yet, the vulnerability/patch cycle for mobile devices is often long, due, in
part, to the potential need to modify the code of several phone manufacturers [4]. Finally, many smartphone
users are non-technical, making security an even greater challenge.
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A successful security architecture must rely as little as possible on the user’s skill-set. It should be simple
and small enough that its execution paths can be evaluated for security, and yet sufficiently elemental to
support a variety of services. In this paper we propose one such security architecture, which uses the phone’s
physical proximity to its user as a basis for authentication.
Threat Model. This work considers attacks by malware applications. The standard defense against such
attacks is application sandboxing, wherein a permission system offers applications a variety of approved
privileges to resources, ranging from sensor access to the ability to display notifications. These privilege-
restrictions limit the potential damage of malicious or exploitable applications.
However, the privilege systems fail if an application ‘breaks out of jail’ by exploiting vulnerabilities in the
(complex) smartphone operating system or a privileged third-party application. Indeed, even security-focused
application-level defenses (e.g., [5]) may fail when the operating system itself is compromised by malware.
Under such conditions, privileged malware can read files, monitor the keyboard, record the microphone, take
pictures and learn the user’s location, all posing a significant threat to users’ privacy.
In order to function even under operating system compromise, our security design is based on a minimal
Trusted Computing Base (µTCB) that supports a few necessary operations. We assume that the µTCB
implementation executes in a dedicated environment and is small enough to be thoroughly validated, we
thus preclude attacks on this component. Our security design further assumes that the user currently
possesses the phone, and thus we preclude physical attacks.
1.1 Design Overview
We integrate a simple and minimal trusted component into the smartphone, and migrate key security-oriented
services from the base operating system (e.g., AndroidTM) to this component. In a way, this component
resembles the micro-kernel approach to secure operating system (OS) design, in which the OS is reduced
to a minimal kernel and most functionalities are implemented outside the kernel; we thus name our trusted
component a Micro Trusted Computing Base (µTCB).
The core of our design is the separation between the smartphone’s complex OS and the µTCB, which
allows applications that execute over the smartphone’s OS to access its services using a programming in-
terface. In addition, when the user presses a dedicated button, called the Secure Attention Key (SAK),
the device enters a special secure-mode. In secure-mode, sensor signals and hardware interrupts are first
processed within the µTCB environment, and only then possibly relayed to the OS. This allows µTCB to
take control of peripherals, such as the screen, and interact with the user securely even if the OS or other
phone subsystems are compromised. By pressing the SAK, the user validates that she physically possesses
the device, thereby distinguishing between automated or remote instructions and user commands.
We demonstrate the applicability of our design with two fundamental examples, secure messaging and
mobile-payment applications; both execute within the smartphone’s OS but base their security on µTCB
services. As a proof-of-concept, we implement our µTCB design within the ARM TrustZone security envi-
ronment and provide a performance evaluation using ARM’s device simulator.
2 Related Works
2.1 Trusted Physical Interfaces
A secure path between the user and a trusted system component is a key requirement of a usable security
architecture, and this is particularly true for smartphones [6], which are widely used by naive users. The
concept of using a dedicated secure attention key (SAK) to establish such a path was introduced in [7]
for opening a secure login-shell. This design is incorporated in modern operating systems, for example,
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Windows’ Ctrl+Alt+Del combination, but is typically limited to login or task management, and can be
affected by a compromised operating system.
Our design adapts this idea of a dedicated button to smartphones. We secure private user data, such as
login passwords, files, and messages, and enable secure management of sensitive sensors. Finally, we provide a
programming interface that allows complex (external) applications to delegate their security building-blocks
to the simple µTCB core.
Among a variety of related works, McCune et al. considered the problem of user-observable path veri-
fication [8], where the user receives a clear and unspoofable feedback that she communicates securely with
a trusted endpoint. To this aim, [8] suggests using a LED indicator connected to the path endpoint. Our
design includes a similar indicator, attached to the µTCB, which signals when the device is in secure-mode
and the user can interact securely with the µTCB. However, we do not solely rely on passive indicators,
combining additional mechanisms to create a ‘defense in depth’-like architecture: we train the user to press
the SAK prior to every sensitive action (ensuring that the device is in secure-mode), as well as force the user
to enter secure-mode to perform certain sensitive operations (such as signing documents).
2.2 Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
TrustVisor [9] is a small TCB, designed for personal-computers, that allows applications to execute security-
sensitive codeblocks (e.g., signature verification). Complementarily, the Trusted Language Runtime (TLR) [10]
architecture provides similar capabilities for smartphones. While TrustVisor and TLR provide important
security guarantees, they are strictly designed to secure computations and not interactions with the user; for
example, a malware that replaces the keyboard device driver could, under both systems, record or modify
the user’s keystrokes.
TrustVisor has been extended to create a trusted path between an input/output (I/O) device and an
application [11]. The design of [11] requires that each application implement its own trusted I/O device
functionality (as part of the TCB); in contrast, our µTCB provides trusted services to untrusted appli-
cations (through a restricted programming interface). This makes it easier to code applications, but also
makes our design less flexible (e.g., only the manufacturer can introduce new TCB primitives). We believe
that codability is essential for today’s constantly growing smartphone application markets: only the most
sophisticated developers can be expected to properly write and thoroughly verify their TCB application code.
In addition, the verification of the trusted path in [11] makes use of an additional hand-held device, which
can be an impediment to consumer adoption; our design embeds a trusted path between the user and µTCB,
which the user can enable by pressing the SAK. This allows us to incorporate the verification indicator into
the smartphone, by placing it under the control of the µTCB.
The trusted sensors architecture of [12] uses a TCB to provide reliable sensor readings for applications, and
Raj et al. [13] show how a TCB could monitor network traffic and attest for its volume. These architectures
provide important services, but do not intrinsically prevent malware applications from obtaining sensor
readings or accessing sensitive files; they are thus complementary to our design.
3 The Micro-TCB Design
In this section we present the µTCB architecture and its interaction methods with the user.
3.1 Architecture
The µTCB platform has two important properties. First, it provides a code-execution environment that is
separated from the smartphone’s OS, allowing µTCB to remain secure even when the OS is compromised.
Second, µTCB code running over this platform can handle or filter signals from sensors and peripherals
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Figure 1: The µTCB Architecture, Components and Trust Assumptions.1
before they are handled by the OS. This property allows privileged access to the secure attention key and
touch-screen signals, and enables µTCB services to confidentially interact with the user (see next subsection).
The µTCB is minimal by design (in order to avoid vulnerabilities), and it thus relegates all but a
few security-oriented services to the smartphone OS; these services, described in Section 4, are accessible
to applications running on smartphone’s OS via a restricted API. Though minimal, µTCB services allow
implementation of complex and fundamental applications, as we show in Section 5.
Figure 1 illustrates our architecture at a high level and the system’s ‘trust assumptions’ in participating
entities, implementation details will be covered in Section 6.
3.2 The Secure Mode and Attention Key
The µTCB has a dedicated Secure Attention Key (SAK) that is not visible to the smartphone’s OS. When
the user presses the SAK, she triggers an interrupt that invokes an interaction with the µTCB system; we
call this interactive mode secure-mode. The µTCB presents to the user a menu of simple services as well as
pending requests from applications, we describe those services and requests in Section 4.
Pressing the SAK ensures that the smartphone is in secure-mode, namely, the SAK is a ‘one-way button’.
In order to exit the secure-mode, the user presses a virtual ‘Exit’ button in the secure-mode menu. The
smartphone also automatically exits secure-mode after idle timeout (e.g., five minutes), this is to avoid
confusing the user regarding the smartphone’s mode after a long idle period.
When in secure-mode, µTCB temporarily handles signals of the touch-screen and filters those of other
sensors, blocking them from reaching the smartphone’s OS so as to ensure that no application, not even one
that escapes ‘out-of-sandbox’, may view or manipulate the screen to leak private user inputs.
Secure-Mode Indicator. A key requirement of our system is that users receive a clear and unspoofable
indication when their smartphone is in secure-mode. We identify two cases where such indication is crucial:
(1) the user enters secret data, (2) the user disables a sensor. In the first case, an application that tricks
the user will learn the secret data; in the second case, a sensor that remains active might expose sensitive
information. To this aim, a LED indicator is connected to the µTCB and lights only when the device is in
secure-mode (the LED is inaccessible to the smartphone’s OS).
Forcing and Training Ceremonies. Usability studies suggest that users often do not notice passive
security indicators; to improve security, we use forcing and training ceremonies [14, 15].
First, the user’s private data and keys are only accessible to µTCB, forcing the user [14] to press the
SAK (and enter the ‘real’ secure-mode) in order to use them, e.g., to sign documents with her private key.
1The Android robot is reproduced from work created and shared by Google and used according to terms described in the
Creative Commons 3.0 Attribution License.
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Figure 2: Role-Based Access Control API Scheme.
Second, we support a training mechanism, shown to improve indicator awareness [15]. We assume an
initial period where the smartphone is infection-free, and simulate a spoofing attack by occasionally neglecting
to light the indicator LED when the smartphone enters secure-mode. Any action by the user without re-
pressing the SAK (i.e., to ensure that the device is in secure-mode and indicator turns on) results in a
negative feedback, e.g., the LED blinks and µTCB notifies the user to notice the indicator.
4 Services and Interfaces
The µTCB provides security-oriented services to the user as well as to applications running on the smart-
phone’s operating system. These services are available through restricted user and application interfaces.
Our application programming interface (API) embeds role-based access restrictions, as illustrated in
Figure 2, to allow applications to access µTCB services only on behalf of a remote peer (representing a
remote entity like a cloud service, contact person or online store) that has permission to use the service. In
such cases, µTCB uses a public key assigned to the peer to cryptographically seal/unseal data for/from the
calling application; in essence, role-based access control allows the application to only relay, but not read or
modify, the sensitive information and, therefore, prevents exposure of such information in the case that the
application is malicious.
We next present the services and interfaces that µTCB offers, organized into four categories: authoriza-
tion, confidentiality, non-repudiation and sensor control.
4.1 Authorization of Peers, Roles and Groups
The µTCB restricts sensitive operations, such as those that disclose private information, to authorized peers.
Each peer is represented by a name assigned to a public key. The peer is authorized for permissions in two
logically orthogonal classes: groups and roles.
Groups restrict the distribution of information, and can be modified or created (by a certificate authority
or the user); for example, work-related documents may be restricted so that they are only sent (under
encryption) to the group of employees of the company.
Roles, on the other hand, restrict the actions permitted by peers. There are exactly three roles:
5
Contact: this role enables a peer to send/receive encrypted and authenticated information to/from the user.
Signatory: peers with this role can send signed documents and request a counter-signature from the user.
Certificate authority (CA): peers with this role are trusted to identify and authorize other peers. A
CA is restricted to authorizing peers of specific groups (e.g., a company’s CA can only authorize its
employees). Credentials of well-known CAs are installed to µTCB before user-adoption, e.g., by the
manufacturer.
User Interface and API. The user may authorize new peers. However, this management option is risky
and should typically be used only by system administrators to authorize a local CA; as such, this option
may be ‘locked’ with an administrative password.
The authorization service is inaccessible to applications, to avoid exposing the user to social engineering
attacks (e.g., where the malware authorizes a peer with similar name to the user’s bank).
4.2 Confidentiality
Smartphones often store sensitive data, ranging from login credentials, to private pictures and messages;
µTCB provides means of ensuring the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of such data, and an infras-
tructure for distributing it among contact peers.
More precisely, µTCB includes a private repository, which is essentially a secure file system (inaccessible
to the OS). Some of the user’s files in the repository, and in particular her private key, are encrypted with a
user-provided credential such as a password; the user’s credential is never saved, so that she must be directly
involved to access this information, helping to mitigate the risk of identity theft from a stolen phone.
The µTCB can also encrypt and authenticate data for transmission to contact peers. In this case, the
sender’s µTCB uses the recipient’s public key to encrypt two symmetric keys: one to encrypt and the other
to authenticate the information. The encrypted keys are signed using the sender’s private key, which allows
the recipient to validate the authenticity and integrity of messages from the sender. We encapsulate messages
using the “encrypt-then-MAC” paradigm, which permits verification of the message’s authenticity prior to
decryption, to quickly discard spoofed messages.
User Interface and API. The user can access the private repository as a general purpose file system.
Each file is associated with an access list of contact peers, identified by their names or groups, who may
receive it.
Applications can use the µTCB to handle private information on behalf of authorized contact peers
(following Figure 2). The API functions that access the confidentiality service state the intended recipient
or the sender of the data, and µTCB validates that he is an authorized contact; the validation result is
returned to the application. If the peer is authorized, then the application prompts the user to press the
SAK and enter secure-mode to interact with µTCB. The user can view the peer’s name and groups while in
secure-mode. The two confidentiality-service API functions operate as follows:
Request-Data(recipient). The µTCB requests the user to enter a message, select a file from the private
repository (that recipient is authorized to read) or send sensor-readings (e.g., camera picture, location coordi-
nates); µTCB then encapsulates the information as described above and returns the cryptographically-sealed
data to the application.
Display-Message(sender, message). The µTCB displays message along with sender’s name and groups.
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4.3 Non-Repudiation
The µTCB allows the user to sign documents presented by signatory peers, possibly after the user completes
her personal details (e.g., name, identification number, etc.), while ensuring that neither the user’s private
key nor her personal details leak to OS applications.
Each document has a type (e.g., banking, commerce, etc.) and some important types are reserved and
may be presented only by peers in specific groups (e.g., only a bank may present a banking form).
User Interface and API. The µTCB stores the documents that the user has signed, and allows the user
to later view those documents. Applications can request the user to sign or display documents on behalf of
signatory peers via the following API functions (that implement the scheme in Figure 2):
Request-Signature(recipient, document). When an application calls this function, µTCB validates that
recipient is an authorized signatory peer, that document is signed by recipient, and that recipient may request
signature for this document type.
When the user presses the SAK and places the smartphone in secure-mode, she can view the document
and possibly complete required personal details; if she approves the signature request, then µTCB uses
her private key to counter-sign the document (the user signs the completed document and the original
signature of recipient). The application receives the user’s signature and personal details encrypted with
recipient’s public key.
Display-Signed-Doc(sender, document). This function is similar to the previous one, but only uses µTCB
to display sender’s signed document to the user (i.e., the user does not counter-sign it).
4.4 Sensor Control
The sensor-rich smartphone allows privileged applications to record, take pictures and locate the user at
any time. Existing smartphone operating systems typically permit users to turn off some sensors (such
as the GPS) for power conservation, but other sensors (such as the microphone or camera) are not directly
controllable. Moreover, on an infected device any of these sensors may be activated without indication to
the user.
In our architecture, the sensors signals are routed to the OS via µTCB, allowing it to completely block
their signals from the OS.
User Interface and API. The user can block or activate the sensors. Applications can request the user to
temporarily enable a sensor via the Enable-Sensor(sensor) function. When an application calls this function,
µTCB validates that sensor is currently blocked (or will be re-blocked soon, see below).
When the user presses the SAK, she can approve activating the sensor for a short period of time (e.g., up
to an hour), or choose to automatically discard activation requests for some time period. The µTCB notifies
the application of the user’s decision and its timeout, allowing the application to again request to activate
the sensor when the decision expires.
5 Applications
In this section we describe example applications that illustrate how µTCB and its API allow implementation
of key security-demanding applications.
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(a) User Interface (c) Training Feedback(b) Sending a Secure Message
Figure 3: Secure Messaging. User interface and training feedback (in virtual machine).
5.1 Messaging
The secure-messaging application includes a check-box where the user can mark messages as ‘secure’, see
Figure 3 (a). In order to send a secure message, the application retrieves the recipient’s certificate (which
includes his public key, groups and role) by requesting it from the recipient’s device, e.g., via SMS or network
interface (the certificate is signed by a CA, and signature validation performed by µTCB).
When the user sends a secure message, the application calls the Request-Data API function, and prompts
the user to press the SAK and enter a message for that recipient, as in Figure 3 (b). The µTCB returns
to the application the cryptographically-sealed message, and the application then sends the message to the
recipient.
When the application receives an encapsulated message, it calls the Display-Message API function and
prompts the user to enter secure-mode to read the message.
In order to encourage users to incorporate the secure functionality, the secure option is set as default
for communication with contacts to whom the user had sent/received a secure message before. If the user
changes this configuration and attempts to send a plaintext message to such contact, the application alerts
the user, as in Figure 3 (c).
5.2 Commerce and Payments
We next present a mobile payment protocol that integrates the µTCB to mitigate the risks of identity theft
and exposure of payment credentials. Our description uses the example of a stock trading application for
sake of exposition. We assume that prior to running the protocol, the user has registered her public key with
her bank.
Protocol. In the offer phase, the user requests to buy a particular stock using a smartphone application.
The application might find several available brokers, all of which should be signatory peers approved by
trusted CAs (e.g., banks), and it presents to the user the information required to decide on a particular offer
(e.g., the broker’s commission). The application calls the Request-Signature API function, which provides to
µTCB the identity of the selected broker and his signed offer.
In the payment phase, the user enters secure-mode and views the broker’s offer; if she decides to accept
it, then she enters the secret credential (e.g., password) for decrypting her private key file in the repository
(see Section 4.2). The µTCB uses the private key to sign an order after the user completes relevant personal
details (e.g., account number). The signed order is cryptographically sealed using the broker’s public key
and the cipher-text is returned to the application which then relays it to the broker.
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Finally, in the confirmation phase, the broker decrypts the user’s response and clears the payment with
her bank. The broker sends a signed receipt to the application, which then calls the Display-Signed-Doc API
function and notifies the user to enter secure-mode to view the receipt. If the user does not receive a receipt
in a timely fashion, she can notify her bank and revoke the transaction (this may be automated).
Security Benefits. This payment protocol improves typical payment applications since it mitigates the
risk for identity theft: the user does not expose her payment credential (i.e., private key) to the bank,
broker or the application (cf. to credit-card payments). Moreover, even if her smartphone is lost or stolen,
a user-chosen credential is required to decrypt her private key, further reducing the risk for impersonation
or fraud.
6 Implementation
In this section we describe our Proof of Concept (PoC) implementation of µTCB over ARM TrustZone,
a trusted code execution platform already available in some of today’s mobile devices. TrustZone sepa-
rates between the normal-world (NWorld), where the rich OS and applications execute, and the secure-
world (SWorld), where the µTCB resides.
We implemented a proof of concept (PoC) prototype to verify that implementation of our design over
TrustZone is feasible. Our PoC implements the µTCB services and provides an API (in form of a library) for
applications running in NWorld; our TCB has less than 8000 lines of source code and is much smaller than
the phone’s OS kernel. We note that our PoC does not modify the smartphone’s OS to provide applications
access to TrustZone and the µTCB APIs. A full implementation would need to make this modification for a
commercial product, but for feasibility-testing purposes it is sufficient to execute simple applications directly
over NWorld.
System Boot. The µTCB (running in SWorld) initializes prior to the smartphone’s OS (running in
NWorld). The TrustZone platform allows µTCB to specify which peripherals’ interrupts should be han-
dled by the smartphone’s OS, and which by µTCB. Initially, the only I/O devices handled by µTCB are the
SAK and the LED indicator, all other peripherals are handled in NWorld by the smartphone’s OS.
Switching to Secure-Mode and Interrupt Masking. When the user presses the SAK, µTCB registers
itself to handle interrupts from the touch-screen, which is required to interact with the user while the
smartphone is in secure-mode (this is changed back when the user exits secure-mode). If the user requests
to block a sensor for privacy reasons (e.g., microphone, camera), µTCB masks its interrupts. The only full
peripheral-device driver required to deploy in µTCB is, therefore, that of the touch-screen.
Such a scheme efficiently handles interrupts in a TrustZone based implementation of µTCB. However,
its implementation is difficult: it requires careful bookkeeping of the touch-screen’s state which should be
restored when the device exits secure-mode, and handling edge cases where the OS is currently using the
peripherals that µTCB needs to block. We leave addressing these issues in our prototype for future work,
and avoid them in our evaluation below by using simple applications that execute directly over NWorld.
Architecture Overhead Evaluation. In order to evaluate our implementation, we utilized the ARM
FastModels product that simulates an ARM device with the Cortex-A9 processor that is common in smart-
phones. We run the simulator on a PC with an Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 4GB of RAM, resulting
in a wait time of roughly 80 seconds to load the simulation. In order to evaluate the overhead of µTCB,
we measure the number of additional processor cycles while performing different operations (system boot,
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API calls and interactions with the user) and use these measurements to estimate execution time on the
Cortex-A9 processor.
The overhead introduced to the smartphone boot process is minimal: the µTCB only initializes the
interrupt handlers, and switches to NWorld to continue the normal boot sequence of the smartphone; the
µTCB initialization requires 1600 processor cycles (less than 3µs on the Cortex-A9 processor).
The cost of switching between the normal and secure worlds is roughly 3000 cycles, or 5µs on the
Cortex-A9. However, it is only ‘paid’ when an application invokes the µTCB via an API call or when the
user presses the SAK to enter secure-mode, and not during the typical operation of the smartphone: When
not in secure-mode, all I/O interrupts (except for the SAK) are handled in NWorld by the smartphone’s OS,
and therefore do not require (expensive) switching between worlds.
Handling the SAK has the highest overhead, since the µTCB ‘takes over’ the screen and displays the
menu to the user, but requires less than 106 cycles or 2ms on the Cortex-A9, which is sufficiently short to
remain unnoticeable to the user.
7 Conclusions
Cellular phones have evolved to ‘smartphones’, complex devices that are much more vulnerable to malware.
This is especially alarming considering their widespread use and access to sensitive information, sensors data,
video/audio feeds and the like.
In order to secure the complex smartphones, we have proposed to delegate critical security services from
the smartphone’s OS to a small and separated µTCB module. Our design integrates the established concepts
of minimal TCB, trusted physical interfaces, user training and forcing ceremonies within the context of
smartphones. We have demonstrated the use of µTCB and SAK for two smartphone applications: messaging
and mobile payments. Finally, we have presented an implementation of µTCB by utilizing TrustZone,
an existing mobile-phone trusted computing platform, and evaluated its performance using ARM’s device
simulator.
During this work, we found that although modern OSs are made aware of underlying hardware security
platforms, it may be challenging to use some of the platforms’ features in practice (e.g., TrustZone’s interrupt-
handlers remapping). We hope that our work will motivate OS vendors to improve their support for such
platforms in the face of increasing threats to users through their smartphones.
7.1 Future Work
Several significant steps are needed to bring our PoC implementation into a generally usable system. To
deploy it with a fully-featured OS, the OS needs to be patched to allow efficient remapping of interrupt
handlers and expose the µTCB API library to applications. The simulator code must also be ported to
smartphone hardware, a nontrivial engineering challenge. Finally, a usability study with deployment on
fully-functional smartphones is important in order to evaluate and improve the proposed security indicator,
user interfaces and the interaction protocols between the user and µTCB.
This work also leaves several questions open for research. For one, it is unclear how to best present
pending requests from applications to the user in secure-mode. It is also interesting to consider alternate
secure-mode indicators, and effective feedback methods to train users to notice such an indicator. Finally, it
would be interesting to leverage the smartphone’s sensors to derive keys without relying on text passwords.
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